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CHAPTER 19 
WAR POWERS UNDER THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 
Stephen Ellmann • 
It may seem strange to inquire into the nature of war powers under South 
Africa's Constitution - for surely South Africa is not a nation that considers itself 
embarked on a policy of war. But I believe the topic is important nonetheless. 
As a matter of principle, there are few greater destroyers of rights, or creators of 
utter and arbitrary inequality, than war, which orders soldiers to kill, sacrifices 
others, and potentially rips apart the fabric of civil society. The power to make war 
is the power to protect and to destroy perhaps the most fundamental right of all, the 
right to live in an ordered society. A state which leaves this power loosely governed 
is a state where rights are not entirely secure, no matter how extensively that state 
protects rights in situations short of war. 
Nor are these abstract considerations for South Africa. South Africa is not a 
warlike state, but it is, compared to other nations in Africa, a well-armed state. 1 Its 
spending to maintain that military strength is at the heart of a bribery scandal that as 
of 2008 still threatens to bring down Jacob Zuma, now President of the African 
National Congress, and may taint others as well.2 Its troops are already serving, or 
have served, in peacekeeping or election-support missions in several other African 
states, including Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Darfur 
in the Sudan, as well as the Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Mozambique, and Uganda - and also in Nepal. 3 Some, fortunately a small 
number, have died in combat outside its borders, in an intervention in Lesotho in 
1998 and more recently in the DRC.4 War is not entirely absent from South Africa's 
politics, even today - and there is of course no telling what the future may hold. 
South Africa's peacekeeping efforts in fact have stretched the nation's current 
military resources,5 and the goal of establishing an African Union peacekeeping 
force will certainly call on South African resources as well.6 
The South African Constitution addresses the possibility of war, and the 
deployment of troops, but not at great length. The brevity of these provisions is 
entirely understandable. No doubt the reason for it was, at least in good part, that 
South Africa's constitution writers - like their counterparts in every nation - wrote a 
constitution not for abstract review but for the governance of their nation with its 
particular and painful history. The legacy of human rights abuses, especially in 
states of emergency, was fresh in the drafters' minds, and they addressed these 
dangers in detail in the new Constitution, but they did not envision their renewed 
country as a war-making state. Perhaps they also did not expect that the new South 
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Africa would play as active a role -as it does in deploying military force on behalf of 
peace - a constructive and admirable role, but one not without risks. 
Meanwhile, we in the United States have re-encountered the issues of war 
powers, as we have faced an unconventional enemy and our government has pressed 
the boundaries of many uncertain constitutional powers while it fashions its 
response to this enemy and others. In the grim light of 9/11 and its aftermath, issues 
of war power that might at one time have seemed obscure or implausible have 
turned out to be present and pointed. War is hell, and havoc, and it is also extremely 
hard to govern constitutionally; the pressures of military necessity drive the meaning 
of constitutional language in ways that only experience may fully reveal. South 
Africa so far has, happily, had little occasion to encounter these questions in its own 
governance. But war is a great danger, even in a country that takes pride in its 
commitments to peace. While l will offer few prescriptions in this paper, I hope that 
it will be useful to South Africans as they develop the constitutional understandings 
that may someday guide the interpretation of their nation's powers of war. 
Let me add one more word of explanation of the inquiry l make in this paper. It 
should surprise no one that South Africa's constitutional provisions dealing with 
war and fighting have some ambiguities - all texts have some ambiguities. I do not 
mean to score debater's points by highlighting linguistic possibilities that may be 
grammatically coherent but are inconsistent with the fundamental themes of the 
South African Constitution. On the contrary, where ambiguity in specific clauses 
can be interpreted by reference to general principles of South African constitutional 
law I will hope to do just that. 
Three such general principles are particularly important. First, and most 
fundamental, all acts of the South African government are subject to the 
Constitution7 - so the notion of war powers that are wholly beyond the reach of 
judicial review is implausible.8 Moreover, the protection of human rights is an 
absolutely integral part of the South African constitutional order. 9 Second, the 
Constitution contains a specific commitment to subject military power to law. The 
Constitution declares that the security services (including military, police and 
intelli~ence services) 'must act ... in accordance with the Constitution and the 
law'. 1 This is not just an abstract sentiment; for the ANC the issue of the armed 
forces' loyalty during the constitutional transition was a critical and delicate one. 11 
Third, the Constitution rejects the idea that war is the province of the executive 
alone. Section 198(d) lays out, as one of the 'governing principles' for the security 
services, that '[n]ational security is subject to the authority of Parliament and the 
national executive' .12 
As important as these general principles are, however, they do not remove the 
n.eed to look carefully at the specific provisions of the South African Constitution 
that deal with war. We will first look at the provisions governing the declaration of a 
state of national defence - the clearest route provided by the Constitution for South 
Africa to enter war. As we will find, the procedural requirements for such 
declarations are distinctly less demanding than those governing the declaration of a 
state of emergency. At the same time, the substantive powers conferred on the 
President by such a declaration - though not beyond Parliament's authority to 
regulate - are potentially far-reaching, both in military terms and in terms of their 
impact on at least some human rights. Next, we will ask whether South Africa can 
become involved in military action without a declaration of a state of national 
defence. The answer appears to be 'yes', and moreover it appears that the President 
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has authority to initiate a range of potentially risky military involvements without 
any direct approval by Parliament - although, again, Parliament may approve, or 
disapprove, if it so chooses. Finally, in light of the extent of military and 
Presidential authority that this analysis has identified, we will consider the role of 
Parliament's power over the budget as a check, albeit not a perfect one, on executive 
military decisions. 
(1) The procedural requirements for a state of national defence 
The Constitution gives no explicit power to anyone to declare 'war'. Perhaps 
such an authority is still implicit in the general powers of the President and 
Parliament, but probably not. Instead, it appears that the drafters of the Constitution 
carefully avoided giving the nation a power to declare war, and instead gave it a 
power to declare a 'state of national defence ' .13 Does this mean that South Africa 
cannot fight a war, or engage its troops in combat 'hostilities'? 14 Surely not. There is 
no sign that South Africa chose to abandon its military when it abolished apartheid, 
and a country with a military is a country prepared, at least in some circumstances, 
to fight. If the country were to be attacked, the declaration of a state of national 
defence must have been meant as a way of declaring that the nation was going to 
fight to defend itself. 15 It may well be that South Africa has no constitutional power 
to fight a war of aggression, 16 but, as we will see, that constraint still leaves room for 
many potential military engagements. 
What are the procedural requirements for the declaration of a state of national 
defence? The first part of the answer to this question is explicit, or almost explicit. 
Section 203(1) says that '[t]he President as head of the national executive may 
declare a state of national defence'. Although this language doesn't in so many 
words prohibit Parliament from also issuing such a declaration on its own, the 
overall content of§ 203 (with its focus on the President's reporting to· Parliament, 
and Parliament's approving the declaration after it has been made) makes clear that 
only the President has this authority. 
More precisely, only the President, or whoever may be serving as Acting 
President, can exercise this authority. Because the authority is transferable, it is 
quite possible that a declaration of a state of national defence could be made by 
someone chosen by the President to serve as Acting President rather than by anyone 
elected by Parliament to play this role. 17 In actual fact, South Africa's intervention 
into Lesotho in 1998, though apparently not based on a declaration of national 
defence but simply on a decision to send troops on the mission, was ordered by 
Mangosothu Buthelezi in his capacity as Acting President while President Nelscin 
Mandela was out of the country' ; Mandela's choice of Buthelezi surelil was related 
to the AN C's efforts to improve relations with this long-time opponent. 9 
It is striking that this power is given to the President. Clearly, explicitly, he or 
she can declare the nation's involvement in war without any prior approval from 
Parliament. (It may be that the President must obtain the approval not only of the 
relevant Cabinet minister but also, for a decision of this magnitude, of the Cabinet 
as a whole.20) Presumably the war can then be fought as well. But the declaration 
'lapses unless it is approved by Parliament within seven days of the declaration' _21 
This requirement of affirmative approval by Parliament means that in South Africa, 
as has also been the practice in the United States,22 a formal declaration of the 
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nation' s martial intent (a declaration of war in the US, a declaration of a state of 
national defence in South Africa) rests on the approval of both of the political 
branches of government. But it must be said that within a week a lot can happen, 
politically and militarily. If the President begins the war on Monday, and South 
African troops have fallen by Saturday, will Parliament be prepared to withhold its 
approval? It has often been suggested that the Presidential power to involve the 
United States in fighting presents our Congress with something approaching a fait 
accompli. 23 In any event, the more firmly the executive maintains political control of 
Parliament - and that control in general seems considerably finner under South 
Africa's system of government than it would be in the United States - the less likely 
that Parliament will withhold its approval. 
Though Parliamentary approval is required for a declaration of a state of national 
defence, it is clear that overall the Constitution imposes much clearer and more 
stringent requirements for a declaration of a state of emergency than it does in 
connection with the declaration of a state of national defence. Specifically: 
First, § 37(1) specifies the grounds on which a state of emergency can be 
declared (a threat to 'the life of the nation'), whereas no specific grounds are spelled 
out for declaring a state of national defence. A state of emergency can only be 
declared in terms of an Act of Parliament,24 but no statute is required as a basis for 
declaring a state of national defence. In fact, the Defence Act does set out grounds 
for declaring a state of national defence,25 but these are not mandated by the 
constitutional text. 
Second, while a state of emergency can last for 21 days without legislative 
endorsement - compared to 7 days for a state of national defence - once initial 
approval has been given by Parliament for a state of emergency, this approval must 
be renewed at least every three months.26 A state of national defence, by contrast, 
appears to extend indefinitely. 
Third, § 37(2) spells out which chamber of Parliament has the power to give or 
withhold approval of a state of emergency - the National Assembly - whereas the 
allocation of this authority for states of national defence is not made explicit. What § 
203(3) says is that 'Parliament' must approve the declaration, and § 42(1) declares 
that Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces (NCOP). 27 lt is not easy to see why the National Assembly should be 
relied upon to approve or disapprove states of emergency, while the National 
Council of Provinces as well as the National Assembly are needed for approval or 
disapproval of states of national defence, but on its face this is what the text 
dictates. 28 Conceivably, however, the NCOP is not meant to play a part in approving 
a declaration of a state of national defence. 1t might be argued that the NCOP's 
powers are limited to 'legislative power', and that approval or disapproval of a 
declaration of a state of national defence is not actually legislation. Rather, this 
function might be seen as a form of oversight over executive power, a responsibility 
apparently reserved to the National Assembly. 29 
If, on the other hand, the NCOP does have a role to play in the approval of a 
declaration of a state of national defence, then how great is that role? If this decision 
is viewed as a form of legislation, presumably it is legislation of national rather than 
distinctively provincial concern.30 If so, then even if the NCOP withholds approval 
of the declaration after the National Assembly has given its endorsement, the 
National Assembly can give Parliament 's approval by re-enacting it? But if this 
approval did count as legislation triggering the special NCOP powers applicable to 
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bills 'affecting provinces', then very different dispute resolution provisions would 
apply. 32 Finally, it could be maintained that the approval of a declaration of a state 
of national defence is not governed by either of the two sets of procedures for 
normal legislation, and that some further process, such as an absolute requirement of 
approval by each House of Parliament, must be inferred for this very special 
function. The failure to fully clarify this complex of issues is a significant omission, 
and a potential source of great difficulty should a state of national defence ever be 
declared. 
Fourth, § 37(2) also forbids the National Assembly from approving or extending 
a state of national emergency without a public legislative debate. No such rule is 
imposed for approval of a state of national defence, though other sections require 
that Parliament's rules in general must have 'due regard' for 'transparency and 
public involvement' .33 It is hard to accept the idea of a state of national defence 
being approved without a public debate - but perhaps the sheer unlikelihood of such 
a step makes the absence of this textual requirement less important. 
Fifth, the required majorities for approval differ. The National Assembly can 
only approve a state of emergency by 'a supporting vote of a majority of the 
members of the Assembly', and can only extend it by 'a supporting vote of at least 
60 per cent of the members of the Assembly' .34 The Constitution imposes no 
supermajority voting requirement for Parliament ' s approval of a state of national 
defence. Presumably, therefore, Parliament is to treat this declaration according to 
one or the other of the two standard models the Constitution provides. .If the 
declaration is treated as equivalent to a 'Bill', then the required quorum in the 
National Assembly is one-half of the members, and the required vote appears to be 
simply a majority of those voting. 35 If, on the other hand, the declaration is not 
treated as a bill, then the required quorum in the National Assembly is only one-
third of the members; a~ain, approval or disapproval would require simply a 
majority of the votes cast. 3 -
Sixth, the Constitution explicitly provides for judicial review of the validity of 
states of emergency - their declaration, the approval and extension of their 
declaration, and any legislation or action taken in consequence of their declaration.37 
It is likely that some form of judicial review of a state of national defence is also 
available, because of the fundamental principle that all government action is subject 
to the Constitution.38 But the Constitution contains no explicit, specific provision for 
such review, and that silence might well support arguments that the available 
judicial review must be particularly deferential. 
(2) The powers granted by the declaration of a state of national defence 
To address this matter, we must consider three issues: (a) If Parliament approves 
a declaration, without more, what powers does the declaration confer on the 
President to wage war?; (b) To what extent can Parliament limit the authority that 
the declaration confers by adding restrictions to it?; and (c) To what extent can the 
President and Parliament together limit otherwise-applicable constitutional rights 
based on a declaration of a state of national defence? Let us take up these three 
questions in order. 
What powers is the President authorized lo employ, if lhe President declares and 
Parliament authorizes a stale of national defence? The text does not explicitly 
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answer this question. The most straightforward inference from the text, however, is 
that when a state of national defence has been declared and authorized, the President 
has full authority (acting with the responsible cabinet minister and the cabinet as a 
whole) to deploy and direct the troops, as their Commander-in-Chief, at least until 
Parliament in some way restricts that authority. 
The President is always the Commander-in-Chief, of course.39 But what are the 
powers of a Commander-in-Chief? The text does not specify these authorities, but, 
again, the most plausible answer is that as Commander-in-Chief, the President has 
the authority to order any lawful military action,40 from preparation for war to actual 
fighting. Suppose, for instance, that troops from one of South Africa's neighbors 
massed on the border. One might imagine that South Africa would move its troops 
to the border in response, and this positioning of forces would be an appropriate 
exercise of Commander-in-Chief powers under a 'state of national defence'. By the 
same logic, Parliament's approval of the state of national defence would also 
authorize the President to launch a preemptive attack on the threatening troops 
(assuming that such an attack could be justified under international law as self-
defence against an imminent invasion). Similarly, it would allow the President to 
repel an attack and pursue the attackers deep into the attacking country's territory, 
assuming that such a response fell within legitimate self-defence under the UN 
Charter and other binding international law. On the same basis, Parliament's 
approval of the declaration of a state of national defence could authorize, without 
further legislative action, the President's taking the attacking country's capital by 
foree and overthrowing the aggressor government. 
It might be argued, however, that Parliament's approval is narrower than this. 
Section 203(1 ), which empowers the President to declare a state of national defence, 
also requires the President to report to Parliament: 
(a) the reasons for the declaration; 
(b) any place where the defence force is being employed; and 
(c) the number of people involved. 
Parliament's approval of the declaration might be thought to be limited to approving 
the particular rationale and the particular level of troop engagement that the 
President has reported to it. This is a possible reading but not, I think, the most 
plausible one. Section 203 does not say that the President's use of troops lapses if it 
is not approved within seven days; rather, it says that the declaration lapses if not 
approved within that period. It seems inevitable that in a war, whatever uses are 
being made of troops in the first seven days will change over the next seven, or 
seven hundred, and there is no sign in the text that each such change requires a fresh 
declaration and a fresh Parliamentary approval. 
It is important to add that the question of Presidential power is not only a 
question of 'what powers' but of 'against whom'. Who can be the target of a 
declaration of a state of national defence? The broader the range of potential targets, 
the wider the potential occasions when the war powers of the nation can be brought 
into play under this mantle. The text does not say who the targets of such 
declarations can be. It seems reasonable to infer, however, that in rejecting the 
rubric of 'declarations of war' the Constitution also puts to one side any possible 
argument that a declaration can only be directed against another nation-state, as 
might have been the case with a declaration of war. Assuming that the declaration 
must be against someone (rather than being, simply, a declaration that the nation is 
in peril, with no specification of the source of the danger), how well must that 
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someone be specified? Would it be constitutional for the President to declare a state 
of national defence against, say, all those who participated in an act of terrorism 
against South Africa, or who aided or harbored those who did? Or all those whom 
the President concludes or finds pa1ticipated in the act of terrorism, or aided or 
harbored those who did?4 1 Or who commit acts of terrorism in the future?42 The 
answers to these questions will help measure the breadth of the President's, and 
Parliament's, authority under a state of national defence. 
Can Parliament limit the authority conferred on the President by its approval of 
a state of national defence? If Parliament's approval of the declaration of a state of 
national defence ordinarily operates to authorize all lawful military action that the 
President may order, still it might be that Parliament can, if it chooses, impose 
limitations on this authorization. The text does not make clear whether Parliament 
has this power, and this is an important and potentially troublesome ambiguity. 
Given that only the President can issue a declaration of a state of national defence, it 
is possible (as a reader suggested) that Parliament's only power as to declarations is 
to approve them or disapprove them, since any Parliamentary modification of the 
declaration might begin to constitute a new declaration, issued by Parliament. The 
basic principle that national security is subject to both Parliamentary and 
Presidential authority, on the other hand, argues in favor of finding that Parliament 
can amend a declaration before approving it. Even if the division of powers with 
regard to declarations impliedly limits Parliament's authority in this respect, 
moreover, a sufficiently independent Parliament might be able to compel a Preside_nt 
to modify and re-issue a declaration, in order to win Parliamentary approval for it. 
In addition, Parliament might well retain authority to approve or disapprove the 
broad policies that the President undertakes by virtue of the declaration. So, for 
example, I would argue that Parliament could choose to forbid the President to 
invade the aggressor nation I imagined earlier, even if the President believed that 
invasion was necessary to erase the peril that nation posed to South Africa and even 
though Parliament had approved the declaration of a state of national defence in 
response to that peril.43 The constitutional text does not spell out such a power to 
approve or disapprove military policies, but it is not precluded by the text, and the 
principle of joint Parliamentary-Presidential responsibility counsels in favor of it. 
Indeed, precisely because a declaration of a state of national defence can last for an 
unlimited time, principles of accountability strongly argue in favor of findi1)g 
Parliamentary power to regulate what is done during the potentially extended 
duration of hostilities. 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Constitution, in addition to requiring the 
President to provide Parliament with certain information in connection with a 
declaration of a state of national defence, also imposes in § 20 I (3) a requirement 
that the President provide information to Parliament concerning a range of 
'employment[sl of the defence force', notably including employment 'in defence of 
the Republic'. 4 If this section is understood to create an ongoing duty of reporting, 
even during an already-approved state of national defence, and if the function of this 
reporting is inferred to be not simply to inform Parliament but to empower it to act, 
then we have reason to find a continuing Parliamentary authority to regulate the 
military course of a state of national defence.45 (Parliament's funding power is a 
further check, as we will see.)46 It is important to recognize, however, that this 
reading affirms Parliamentary review power but does not establish any requirement 
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of Parliamentary approval as a predicate for Presidential action. As long as 
Parliament does not order otherwise, it seems quite likely that the declaration of a 
state of national defence confers, or accepts, unlimited Commander-in-Chief 
authority bound only by general South African or international law. 
Moreover, assuming that Parliament does have this implied authority to limit the 
President's freedom of action in a state of national defence, it would appear to be 
subject to a possibly significant limit: Parliament presumably cannot impose 
modifications that in effect prevent the President from performing the role of 
Commander-in-Chief. What this limit would entail is by no means certain, and I do 
not mean to suggest that aggressively expansive notions of executive war-making 
power would be compatible with South Africa's constitutional order. But still this 
limit does seem to have at least some content. Parliament probably could not, for 
example, require that Presidential military orders be co-signed by the Speaker of the 
National Assembly; the President, not the Speaker, is the Commander-in-Chief.47 
Parliament also cannot order the 'employment' of troops in defence of the nation; 
'[o]nly the President, as head of the national executive', has that authority, under§ 
201 (2) of the Constitution.48 If Parliament cannot order the 'employment' of troops, 
its power to order, or to compel the President to order, their 'deployment' during a 
state of national defence may also be limited. Thus, although I have already urged 
that Parliament would have the power to regulate the broad outlines of war (for 
example, to forbid an invasion as a form of self-defence), it is open to question 
wh,yther Parliament could direct the President in a state of national defence to attack 
one base rather than another, to defend one town but not a second, or to use armored 
personnel carriers but not tanks.49 Once a state of national defence has been declared 
and approved, some considerable authority may pass to the President in a way that 
Parliament cannot restrict. 
To what extent does the declaration of a state of national defence authorize 
limitations on otherwise protected human rights? We can begin to answer this 
question by asking another: Does the declaration of a state of national defence also 
declare a state of national emergency? The answer to this question is clearly 'no'. A 
state of national defence is not a state of emergency, and a state of emergency is not 
a state of national defence. The brief constitutional text bearing on states of national 
defence does not suggest a recognition that constitutional rights would be subject to 
extensive abridgment, whereas the text addressing states of emergency focuses 
elaborately on exactly this prospect. It seems reasonable to say that in South Africa 
the only time that constitutional rights can be 'derogated' from is in a state of 
emergency, although the text of§ 37 (on states of emergency) does not actually say 
this in so many words. 
As we have seen, the constitutional provisions governing the declaration and 
continuation of states of emergency are in general more demanding than those 
governing states of national defence. It appears to follow, therefore, that in South 
Africa the government is considerably freer to engage troops in battle than it is to 
deprive people of constitutional rights. This statement is somewhat startling, but not 
necessarily cause for concern. It may be that states of national defence are so much 
less tempting as instruments of potential authoritarian oppression than states of 
emergency are that fewer constitutional limits need to be imposed on their use; 
realpolitik itself wi II protect the nation. 
While this may be so, it is important to recognize that the powers employed in a 
state. of national defence do have important human rights implications. Sending 
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troops into battle risks depriving them of their lives. Section 11 of the Constitution 
protects the right to life, which cannot be derogated from even in a state of 
emergency, under§ 37(5)(c). It must follow that orders sending troops into battle in 
a lawfully-undertaken war are justified under § 36 as a limitation on the soldiers' 
right to life, and so can be issued without effecting a derogation from that right. 50 
There are other ways in which the violent clashes that a state of national defence 
would authorize would inevitably impair otherwise fully-protected constitutional 
rights, even if a state of national defence is not meant to authorize limitations of the 
sort contemplated in states of emergency. I will put aside here the possibility of 
military conflict so grave that the civil courts cannot stay open; there lies the 
ultimate recourse of martial law, unmentioned in the South African Constitution (as 
it is unmentioned in the United States Constitution) yet still present somewhere in 
the wings. 51 
Far from the realm of martial law, the existence of a state of national defence 
would raise other issues of limitation of constitutional rights. Suppose, for example, 
that South Africa faced the likelihood of imminent terrorist attack by a foreign 
terrorist group, and had declared a state of national defence as a result. Unless 
Parliament enacted limitations, presumably the President would be entitled to use all 
normally lawful military steps to ward off the attack. In an actual war, the armies of 
one side monitor the communications of the other, and they do not usually stop to 
obtain court authorization first. It would seem that the President, as commander-in-
chief of the South African National Defense Force, would have the authority to 
order electronic surveillance of communications among members of this foreign 
terrorist group abroad, without case-by-case judicial review, though doi•ng so would 
certainly impair their privacy of communications under § 14(d).52 Would the 
President have the same authority as to communications by members of the group 
abroad to their (known? suspected?) confederates within South Africa, assuming 
those confederates are also not South African citizens? What about communications 
from outside South Africa into the country, when either the sender or recipient is a 
South African citizen? And what about communications going the other way?53 
And, finally, what if the group against which the state of national defence has been 
declared is a domestic, South African terrorist group?54 
I don't mean that these questions are unanswerable, or that the exercise of such 
wartime authority would be beyond review by the courts or regulation by 
Parliament. But it is hard to believe that the mies governing surveillance in a state of 
national defence would be the same as those applying in ordinary circumstances; 
some limitations on normally available rights would likely be justified by the needs 
of the state of national defence. The power to declare a state of national defence 
means that military need and domestic constitutional liberty may overlap and 
conflict, and the exact contours of the boundary between them have not yet been 
worked out. 
These inferences may seem feverish. In fact, however, the Defence Act appears 
to go considerably further. Section 91 (I) gives the President broad authority to make 
regulations to deal with the tasks of a state of national defence, and § 91 (2) makes 
clear that such regulations can have a very substantial effect on constitutional rights. 
It remains to be seen, of course, whether the powers conferred in these sections are 
constitutional, but the existence of the statute presumably reflects at least the view 
of Parliament and the President that the Constitution does permit these provisions. 
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The subsections of § 91 cover a considerable range of issues affecting human 
rights. To begin with,§§ 91(2)(a) - (t) appear to authorize the President to impose a 
draft (referred to as a 'mobilization'). Section 91 (2)(g) authorizes regulations 
dealing with 'the security of national key points and other places that may be 
designated', but does not specify what steps such regulations might require. Section 
91(2)(h) provides for 'censorship of information', clearly a limitation on free 
speech. Section 91 (2)(i) empowers the President to make regulations dealing with 
'the evacuation or concentration of persons, including curfew laws'. All such laws 
impinge on freedom of movement and association, and an American reader cannot 
help but think of the worst instance of the use of such power in our history, the 
exclusion of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast early in World War II, and 
their confinement in camps for years thereafter. A South African reader may think 
just as quickly of the disease-ridden concentration camps created by the British 
during the Boer War. 
Finally,§ 91(2)(1) addresses regulations of 'places of custody or detention'. On 
this score, it is worth noting that § 37(8) of the Constitution makes clear that the 
many provisions of§ 37 which protect detainees during states of emergency 
do not apply to persons who are not South African citizens and who are 
detained in consequence of an international anned conflict. Instead, the 
state must comply with the standards binding on the Republic under 
international humanitarian law in respect to the detention of such 
persons. 
Section 37(8) appears to apply whether or not a state of emergency is in place, and 
seems to say that the rules of detention applicable to foreigners detained in 
consequence of an international armed conflict are simply those required by 
international humanitarian law, not those that might otherwise be inferred from 
other provisions of the Constitution. Thus a non-South African detained in these 
circumstances would have neither the rights of a normal detainee under § 35 of the 
Constitution, nor the rights of an emergency detainee under § 37 (unless 
international humanitarian law binding on South Africa provided otherwise, either 
by directly mandating such protections or by requiring that non-South Africans 
receive the same protections as South Africans enjoy). And this would be true even 
if the non-South African was detained or (to use a more military term) taken 
prisoner on South African soil and thereafter detained inside South Africa as well. 
To all of this, it is important to add that the list of topics in § 91 (2) may not be 
exclusive. Indeed, the breadth of§ 91(1)'s general authorization suggests that the 
specific powers given in§ 91(2) might be viewed as exemplifying a range of other 
authorities to impinge, where necessary, on constitutional liberties. Whether § 
91(2)'s provisions, or broader implications from them, are constitutional remains to 
be litigated, and of course the constitutionality of any particular exercises of the 
Defence Act powers will also be subject to constitutional review. But the statute 
does at least confirm the possibility that states of national defence will involve 
significant limitations on otherwise protected rights, limitations with some 
resemblance to the 'derogations' that are authorized, but much more carefully 
addressed, in the state of emergency provisions of the Constitution. It might be 
argued that the differences do not matter, since South Africa can always declare and 
approve declarations of a state of national defence and of a state of emergency 
simultaneously. A state of emergency is harder to start and harder to maintain, 
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however, and so the existence of this partially overlapping, less regulated authority 
is troubling. 
(3) Hostilities wit/tout a declaration of a state of national defence 
Although the declaration of a state of national defence under § 203 of the 
Constitution appears to be the way that South Africa can declare its fullest 
engagement in the use of military force, it is clearly not the only path by which the 
country can employ its armed forces. Instead, § 201 (2) creates another route, and 
one which the President may take the nation along without affirmative 
Parliamentary ratification. This section declares that: 
Only the President, as head of the national executive, may authorize 
the employment of the defence force -
(a) in cooperation with the police service; 
(b) in defence of the Republic; or 
(c) in fulfillment of an international obligation. 
Action in defence of the Republic under § 201 (2)(b) presumably is, or at least may 
be, taken pursuant to a declaration of a state of national defence. The distinction 
drawn in § 201(2) between such defence and the use of force 'in fulfillment of an 
international obligation', however, suggests that the latter is not encompassed in a 
'state of national defence'. 55 Moreover, this reading of§§ 201(2) and 203 accords 
both with the natural sense of the words 'national defence' - for su_rely national 
defence is not directly implicated by peacekeeping missions far from South Africa's 
borders - and with South African practice, under which troops have been sent to a 
number of countries for peacekeeping purposes without, as f?r as I am aware, any 
declarations of a state of national defence.5 
Peacekeeping missions do not seek combat, but combat can certainly arise in 
them. In point of fact, as we have seen, South Africans engaged in interventions of 
this sort have taken casualties in both Lesotho and the DRC. Once troops are 
deployed in a situation of potential strife, active fighting and war are always 
possibilities; indeed, even deployments under conditions of peace (say, a 
deployment of troops to Namibia as a check on any potential rise of territorjal 
ambitions against Namibia in other nations) ultimately pose this risk. 
Given that peacekeeping missions carry with them some risk of involvement in 
actual fighting, as might other military deployments ordered by the President57, is 
affirmative Parliamentary approval required for these steps? The answer seems 
clearly to be 'no'; as long as Parliament does not affirmatively disapprove (and as 
long as funds are available), the military action can continue. This is apparent from 
section 201(3), which requires the President to 'inform Parliament, promptly and in 
appropriate detail', of a range of information about any employment of the defence 
force which he or she has ordered under 20 l (2). This reporting requirement is a wise 
one, but what the section requires is only reporting; it does not require any vote by 
Parliament on the matter. In fact, the text does not even explicitly authorize 
Parliament to vote on the matter, though I believe, as I have already argued in 
connection with declarations of a state of national defence58, that the principle of 
joint Parliamentary-Presidential control over the military does mean that Parliament 
can vote if it so chooses.59 
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It is important that Parliament have this authority. But it is also important to 
recognize that if Parliament has this authority, and chooses to take no action 
whatsoever, the President's decision stands. Only an affirmative decision by 
Parliament to modify or reject the President's choice constrains his power; inaction 
constitutes acceptance (at least as long as funds are available). As l have already 
suggested, it is also important to recognize that if the President makes decisions that 
embroil the nation in fighting, Parliament may find it very hard to respond then by 
demanding a reversal of the President's judgments. The President has the authority, 
as long as Parliament does not affirmatively object, to take the nation a substantial 
distance, perhaps politically an irreversible distance, along the road towards war. 
Suppose now that in the course of a deployment of troops ordered by the 
President, and not objected to by Parliament, fighting does break out. Must a state of 
national defence now be declared, and Parliamentary approval obtained? Parliament 
might find it hard to withhold its approval, as I've just noted, but still it would have 
a chance, and indeed an obligation, to endorse or not endorse such a declaration if it 
was issued - and unless it gave its approval, the declaration would lapse. 
But the constitutional text does not say that a state of national defence must be 
declared whenever actual fighting breaks out. The fact is that the text does not say 
that a declaration of a state of national defence is required as a prerequisite, or an 
acC'ompaniment, even to a full-scale war. Nor is it clear that such a declaration plays 
any international law role (as a declaration of war might have, especially in earlier 
times), and so it may be that no implied requirement of such declarations can be 
inferred in the text based on international law. It would have been possible for the 
Constitution to have explicitly forbidden war or fighting in the absence of a 
declaration, but no such prohibition has been spelled out.60 l would infer 
nevertheless that a full-scale war (unlike the sorts of smaller-scale hostilities 
discussed above) does need to rest on such .a declaration, since the declaration 
process seems designed to provide notice to the nation and to insure that 
Parliament's assent is obtained as part of the country's going to war - but the point 
remains debatable because the text is not explicit. 
As to lesser mi litary engagements, moreover, I do not think the same inference 
follows. The Constitution empowers the President to send troops abroad for 
peacekeeping, as long as Parliament does not object. Peacekeeping can be violent. 
To authorize a peacekeeping mission, it seems to me, is to authorize some limited 
amount of actual fighting in the course of that mission - and the Constitution 
authorizes the President to undertake such missions so long as Parliament does not 
affirmatively object. There may, in addition, be legitimate reasons for a President's 
not wanting to declare a state of national defence. Such a declaration might trigger 
domestic powers that the President fears would burden, or upset, the country. It 
might also carry foreign policy connotations that would fuel a crisis atmosphere 
internationally that the President would like to dissipate, precisely in order to 
accomplish the peacekeeping objectives for which the troops have been deployed. 61 
Finally, even after South African troops have been shot at, it may not really be the 
case that 'national defence' is at stake, and so the provision for a declaration of a 
state of national defence may not truly be applicable in these circumstances. For all 
of these reasons, it seems to me that some level of combat is possible in the course 
of an authorized employment of South African troops without the need for a 
declaration of a state of national defence and therefore, once again, without any 
need for Parliament to give or withhold its approval for the enterprise. Exactly what 
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level of combat triggers the need for a declaration remains, inescapably, unclear in 
the text. 
Suppose, finally, that the President does declare a state of national defence, but 
Parliament refuses to approve it. Then must the fighting stop? Again, the text does 
not say this, but surely it must be the case that where a declaration is constitutionally 
required, its absence means the fighting must come to a halt. As we have just seen, 
however, it is not by any means certain just when a declaration is constitutionally 
required. Perhaps the President would argue that the fighting in question didn't 
actually rise to the level (whatever it might be) for which a declaration of national 
defence was required, and therefore that although he or she had issued the 
declaration and sought Parliament's approval as a matter of prudence, Parliament's 
failure to approve did not remove the President's prerogative to continue the 
fighting. That position would be especially forceful if Parliament did not actually 
disapprove the declaration, but simply never brought it to a vote and so failed to 
approve it. So, too, the President's position would have force if Parliament 
disapproved the declaration, but at the same time rejected a proposal to de-fund the 
fi ghting.62 Or perhaps the President would argue that although Parliament's failure 
to approve the declaration meant that the fighting had to be brought to an end, 
Parliament couldn't possibly have meant that South African troops should be placed 
in jeopardy as the process of disengaging from the enemy took place, and therefore 
that the fighting would have to continue for a considerable period in order to insure 
the safe extrication of South African troops.63 Whatever the correct 'view of this 
matter, it is quite clear that the text leaves it ambiguous, and that makes it equally 
clear that in a situation where this point became important, the President could claim 
various forms of authority to continue. Though a South African court might well be 
readier to review such claims of authority than an American judge today, still it 
would not be easy for a court to reject a President's claim of authority while battle 
actually raged. 
( 4) The power of the purse? 
Let us begin our examination of Parliament's power to limit war by restricting 
spending somewhat indirectly, by considering the problem of how, once the 
President has declared a state of national defence, and Parliament has approved it, it 
comes to an end. No doubt, if the President wages war and achieves victory, both 
branches of government will be happy to recognize the end of the state of national 
defence. But can the President un-declare a state of national defence without 
Parliament's approval? If an Acting President declares it, can the President, on 
returning to his or her duties, revoke it? 1 f the President has some revocation power, 
does it last only until Parliament has actually approved the state of national defence, 
or go on indefinitely? Perhaps more importantly, can Parliament withdraw its 
approval once it has given it? Can a single chamber of Parliament withdraw its 
approval, or must both chambers concur? 
All of these points are left unspecified by the text. It is plausible to infer that 
since a state of national defence must rest on the assent of both political branches of 
South Africa's government, each branch can also revoke its consent. But as a 
practical matter, it may be very hard for either branch to overturn a state of national 
defence to which the other is committed, and, continuing as a practical matter, it 
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may be very hard in particular for Parliament to abrogate a state of national defence 
to which the President remains committed. Moreover, the logic of the basic 
inference of a power for a single branch of government to revoke the declaration is 
uncertain: once both branches have assented to the declaration of a state of national 
defence, it might be argued that only a decision by both branches can revoke it. Or 
(as a reader has suggested) perhaps the declaration of a state of national defence, 
once approved by Parliament, is so profound a vesting of authority in the President 
that only the President can end it. 
The most important powers Parliament may have to control executive uses of 
military force may lie elsewhere. I have already argued that Parliament can 
disapprove the President's uses of force even after approving a declaration of a state 
of national defence under section 203 of the Constitution (as long as it does not 
interfere with the President's commander-in-chief authority). So, too, l ' ve argued 
that Parliament can disapprove any Presidential employment of troops under section 
201 of the Constitution. But Parliament does not have to exercise these powers. In 
contrast, Parliament also has authority to give or withhold funding for the nation's 
military engagements, and this power Parliament at least to some extent cannot 
escape exercising. 
As a general proposition, the President cannot spend money without Parliament's 
hav.ing authorized it. The Constitution establishes this rule by requiring that all 
revenues received by South Africa must be ~aid into the 'National Revenue·Fund', 
unless Parliament legislates to the contrary. Once revenue has been deposited in 
this Fund, the Constitution specifies that it normall¥ can only be withdrawn if 
Parliament appropriates or authorizes the withdrawal.6 Hence even if the President 
engages in peacekeeping missions for which, say, the United Nations provides 
reimbursement, those UN funds apparently will go into the National Revenue Fund 
and become subject to Parliamentary control rather than unilateral Presidential 
disposition. Whether the revenues to be spent come from the United Nations or 
domestic taxes, unless Parliament has provided the President with spending 
authority, the President cannot carry on.66 
In principle, this funding authority appears to be the strongest check on 
Presidential power in the field of war. I would assume - as elsewhere, in part on the 
basis of the fundamental principle of shared Parliamentary and Presidential 
authority - that this power applies whether or not the President has obtained 
approval of a declaration of a state of national defence, and even if the President is 
in the midst of exercising his or her commander-in-chief and foreign affairs 
authority in the prosecution of some military objective. The President is 
commander-in-chief only of those forces Parliament provides, as Justice Robert 
Jackson pointed out in an important war powers case in the United States.67 ln the 
United States, this power has on occasion been used with some effect, notably in 
bringing an end to the late Vietnam War bombing of Cambodia.68 It has also been 
notoriously circumvented, in the Iran-Contra affair.69 
Though it is possible to argue for an implied Presidential authority to take 
otherwise unauthorized action, including spending money, in a dire emergency,70 I 
believe that a general argument for an implied Presidential power to fund wars 
without Parliamentary approval would be alien to South African constitutionalism, 
and therefore that Parliament can end a war by de-funding it. A more difficult issue 
is whether Parliament can use its funding power to constrict the President's 
commander-in-chief authority in a war that Parliament has not chosen to end. If 
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there are limits on Parliament's power to directly control the tactical choices the 
President may make in an ongoing, duly authorized war,7 1 then Parliament might 
well also be barred from using its funding power to impose restrictions on the 
conduct of the war that it could not directly require. Exactly where the line is 
between Parliament's authority to decide what wars South Africa's money is to be 
spent on, and the President's authority to decide how to spend the money Parliament 
has appropriated for war, is no easy question. Despite this ambiguity, the power to 
end a war by ending its financing is a profound one. 
Yet it will undoubtedly be difficult for Parliament to wield this authority, and 
probably more difficult, politically, than in the United States (given the greater 
overlap of the executive and legislature in South Africa than in the US). Moreover, 
there are two other reasons for some hesitation about the efficacy of this power in 
South Africa. The first is the special legislative authority that the executive holds in 
the area of budgeting, under the Constitution. Under § 73(2) 'only the Cabinet 
member responsible for national financial matters may introduce [a money Bill] in 
the Assembly' .72 The United States Constitution, by contrast, provides that 'All Bills 
for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives'. 73 No member 
of Parliament seeking to end a war to which the President and the Cabinet are 
committed, therefore, can introduce a bill proposing to cut off the war's funds. 
This limitation should not mean that Parliament is without power to make 
spending decisions. 74 Most clearly, Parliament can reject the Executive ' s war when 
the Executive proposes legislation to fund it. But this power is less s-alient than it 
would be in the United States, because the President may not need to apply to 
Parliament for more money for a considerable time. There docs not appear to be a 
constitutional limit on the period of time for which Parliament can approwiate 
military spending funds (in contrast to the US Constitution's two-year limit), 5 and 
so, at least in theory, an extended appropriation at one point could fund a 
considerable length of military activity without further specific approval. 76 
In addition, Parliament should be able to amend a money bill already introduced, 
so as to include a provision barring any further spending for the military operation 
in question, and to revoke, if need be, any previously-granted appropriation. Section 
77(3) of the Constitution seems meant to insure Parliament's authority to ame11d 
money bills, since it declares that '[a]n Act of Parliament must provide for a 
procedure to amend money Bills before Parliament' .77 It is somewhat disquieting 
that this legislation has not yet been enacted, as of May 2008. 78 In practice, the 
result apparently is that money bills normally cannot be amended in the National 
Assembly. 79 While the National Assembly arguably might exercise the power to 
amend even in the absence of implementing legislation, it would seem that the 
practical value of amending appropriations bills as a tool for controlling executive 
war will be determined by the shape of that legislation, if and when it is enacted. 
The second reason for hesitation about the efficacy of the funding power is, 
perhaps, simply an illustration of the political difficulties of wielding this authority: 
in practice, so far, it appears that the executive has at least on occasion been able to 
undertake military missions without seeking specific funding approval in advance. 
At a 2003 parliamentary committee discussion of the White Paper on Peace 
Missions, General Rau tie Rautenbach, Budget Director for the Department of 
Defence, reportedly 'noted that for the most part peace missions were an unforeseen 
occurrence and that by that very nature there was normally no budgetary provision 
for this development. He informed the Committee that the DOD had a deficit of 
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R200 million that had been occasioned by peace-keepinf expeditions noting that the 
current budget did not provide for this kind of money' .8 That deficit may have been 
unusual, but budget adjustments to cover unanticipated spending are quite 
permissible under South African law.81 
The National Assembly does, finally, have one further recourse: it can eject the 
President from office, by either of two possible routes. First, it can 'remove the 
President from office' under§ 89. That step, however, requires a vote of two-thirds 
of the members of the Assembly. Moreover, it is not entirely self-evident that the 
President's determination to continue fighting an unpopular war would constitute 
one of the specified grounds on which a vote of no confidence can be based: serious 
illegal conduct, serious misconduct or inability to perform the functions of the 
office. 82 
Second, and more easily, the National Assembly can require the President (and 
the entire Cabinet at the same time) to resign, by approving a 'motion of no 
confidence'. But even this step is not altogether simple - even assuming Parliament 
is prepared to bring down the entire existing executive - because it requires 'a vote 
supported by a majority of [the National Assembly's] members'. 83 National 
Assembly members determined to end a war might find it easier to do so by 
exercising Parliament's appropriations power. To pass a bill cutting off funding for 
a war, as few as one-fourth-plus-one of the members of the Assembly would be 
sufficient,84 even though they would also have to vote to override the National 
Council of Provinces, if that body opposed the legislation.85 
Conclusion 
The text of the South African Constitut ion, in short, imposes only partial limits 
on the power of South Africa's President to involve the nation in fighting or war 
(within the limits of international law), and on the simultaneous potential for 
limitation of constitutional rights South Africa otherwise holds dear. Perhaps South 
Africa will not actually face the agonizing possibilities of war with any frequency. 
But it is difficult to be confident of such predictions. Moreover, it is hard to be 
confident that military power, if it exists and is used, will not be subject to misuse as 
well. In other areas of human rights protection, South Africa's constitutional drafters 
chose to take few chances; they defined a wide range of rights, mandated 
governmental protection and respect for them, and created a powerful Constitutional 
Court, among other institutions, to make those commitments enforceable. In these 
areas, South Africans developed an apparatus of constitutional protection that is 
profoundly impressive. In the field of war, however, the Constitution took fewer 
precautions. 
South Africans themselves will be better suited than I to decide whether to seek 
changes in the constitutional text or instead to rely on the growing strength of South 
Africa's constitutional traditions to guide interpretation of the current text if and 
when these issues must be addressed. This paper has sought both to outline a rights-
protective interpretation of the present text and to point to aspects of the text - the 
procedures for Par! iamentary approval of a declaration of a state of national defence, 
and the absence of a requirement of affirmative Parliamentary approval for 
Presidential decisions to employ troops, particularly in peacekeeping abroad -
where stronger provisions wou ld be desirable. I hope this paper will suggest other 
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areas as well that may deserve attention, but I take very seriously a reader's caution 
that interpretation might be preferable to amendment, because efforts to amend the 
constitutional text today might increase rather than limit executive prerogative. 
Finally, I must close by saying that experience in the United States, hard experience, 
shows that to regulate killing and chaos - war - by law is always, to some extent, 
impossible. 
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the engagement of South African troops in combat, short or prolonged; exactly when the term 'war' 
becomes applicab le to these engagements is not the central issue, for the Constitution itself does not 
make it so. · 
15 Again, whether South Africa can also fight without a declaration of a state of nationa l defence is a 
separate question, to which we will return. See text at notes 55-63 below. 
16 Currie and de Waal point out that wars of aggression are now violations of international law as well. 
Currie & de Waal, The New Constitutional Law, vol. I, p. 252. 
11 See§ 90(2) . The Acting President could even be a Minister chosen from outside Parliament, and thus 
entirely unelected.§§ 90( 1) & 91(2)-(3). 
18 Buthelezi reportedly did, however, consu lt with both President Mandela and Deputy President Mbeki 
(who also was out of the country at the time), before ordering the military entry into Lesotho. Both 
'approved the operation'. Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, 'South Africa Weighs Withdrawal from Messy 
Lesotho Intervention [-] Resistance Was Fiercer, and Intelligence Less Reliable Than Expected , 
Baltimore Sun, Sept. 26, 1998 (ava il ab le on Westlaw - ALLNEWS database). South Africa apparently 
expected its entry to be quite uneventfu l, and initially its troops were supplied on ly with blank 
ammun ition. Id. 
19 See Steytler & Mettler, 'Federal Arrangements', 102; Richard Elli s, 'Zulu Chief Keeps Low Profile 
on the Campaign Trail', Scotsman, June 2, 1999 (ava ilable on Westlaw - ALLNEWS database). 
2° Currie & de Waal maintain that the President must obtain the counters ignature of the relevant 
Cabinet minister for any action within the sphere of that Minister's authority, see § 10 I (2), but also 
that ' [i]f the issue has implications for government as a whole or concerns matters of real political 
importance, the President cannot act with the concurrence of a Minister, but the approval of Cab inet 
must be obta ined', see§ 85(2). Currie & de Waa l, New Constitutional Law, vol. I, p. 246. Thus the 
President would need the signature of the Mini ster of Defence for orders to the troops, see §§ 20 I ( I), 
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202(2), and perhaps the approval of the Cabinet as a whole for a declaration of a state of national 
defence or other commitments of troops to potential combat. It seems unlikely that these requirements 
would ord inari ly prevent a Pres ident convinced of the need for warlike action from proceeding. 
21 § 203(3). 
22 See J. Gregory Sidak, 'To Declare War', ( I 991) 41 Duke L.J. 27, 81-85. 
23 In the United States, if the President undertakes military action without a declaration of war, the War 
Powers Resolution (a statute) normally requires an end to the operation if it does not receive 
Congressional approva l - but 60 da)'.S can elapse before that approval is obtained. War Powers 
Resolution, § 5(b ), 50 USC § l 544(b) (2000). 
24 §37( 1). 
25 Defence Act, Act No. 42 of 2002 (cited hereafter as "Defence Act"), § 891 says that the President 
may declare a state of national defence 'if, among other things, the sovereignty or territory of the 
Republic -
(a) 
(b) 
is threatened by war, including biological or chemical warfare, or invasion, 
armed attack or armed confl ict; or 
is being or has been invaded or is under armed or cyber attack or subject to a 
state of armed conflict'. 
26 § 37(2)(b). 
27 I am grateful to a reader for pointing this out to me. 
28 Abstract ly, it might seem harder for the executive to obtain the approva l of two houses of Parliament 
than of just one, and so a requirement of bicameral approval might be seen as a way of slow ing the 
march towards war - though it would remain unclear why a similar check on the move to a state of 
emergency was unnecessary. As a practical matter, however, at least in today's South Africa, the 
chance of such disagreement between the two houses of Parliament seems sma ll. 
29 See Steven Budlender, 'National Legislative Authority', in S. Woolman et al. (eds.), Constitutional 
law of South Africa, 2 vols., 2d ed. (Lansdowne: Juta and Co., 2004), vol. I, pp. 17-1, 17-3 ('The 
national executive is accountable to the National Assembly and not to the NCOP'.); compare § 68 
(section on 'Powers of National Counci l' detailing only "legislat ive power') with § 55 (section on 
'Powers of National Assembly' separately describing the Assembly's legislative power and its 
accountabi lity/oversight power). Even if the NCOP does perform oversight functions in practice, 
perhaps its oversight role is not sufficiently secured by the Constitution to extend to 'oversight' of the 
declaration of a state of national defence. 
30 See §§ 75-76. 
31 § 75( 1); Budlender, 'National Legislative Authority', p. 17-15. 
32 § 76. The NCOP also fo llows substantially different voting procedures ('one legislator, one vote' or 
'one provincial delegation, one vote'), depending on which category oflegislation it is considering. See 
§§ 65, 75(2); Budlender, 'Nationa l Legislative Authority', pp. 17-4 to 17-6. 
n See id. , p. 17-37, citing§§ 57(l)(b), 70(1)(b). 
34 § 3 7(2). Bruce Ackerman characterizes the 60-percent majority requirement for extend ing a state of 
emergency as 'the first supermajoritarian esca lator in the constitutional world', and sees in it a 
confirmation of the value of simi lar structures for the United States. Bruce Ackerman, 'The Emergency 
Constitution', (2004) 11 3 Yale L.J. 1029, 1055. 
35 §53( 1). 
36 See§ 53( I). For the decision rules potentially applicable in the NCOP, see§§ 65(1 ), 75(2). 
37 § 37(3). 
38 But see Ziyad Motala & Cyril Ramaphosa, Constitutional law: Analysis and Cases (Cape Town: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 2 18-20 (suggesting that the President's use of defence powers 
would be large ly or entirely non-justiciable). 
39 § 202( 1). 
40 Lawful, that is, under South African law and also lawful under the international law of war to the 
extent South Africa is bound by it. §§ 231-32. So, for example, South African legislation or the Geneva 
Conventions would constrain the President ' s authority to direct the treatment of prisoners of war who 
were taken during the fighting that the declaration of a state of national defence authorized. 
4 1 Cf Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. I 07-40, I I 5 Stat. 224, § 2(a) (Sept. I 8, 
200 I) (authorizing the use of force against those the President 'determines' were connected to the 
September 11 attacks or to the attackers). 
42 Proposed language for the AUMF would have authorized the use of force not only aga inst those 
connected to the September 11 attacks, but also to 'deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or 
aggression against the United States'. Tom Daschle, 'Power We Didn't Grant', Washington Post, Dec. 
23, 2005 (avai lable on Westlaw - ALLNEWS database). 
43 Though US law on this question is decidedly ambiguous, there are early Supreme Court cases 
supporting the conclusion that Congress retained a power to limit Presidential warmaking discretion, in 
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undeclared wars and even in declared ones. See Little v. Barreme, 6 US (2 Cranch) 170 ( 1804); Brown 
v. US, 12 US (8 Cranch) 110 ( l 814). Language in an important Civil War decision, however, suggests 
a broader scope for Presidential discretion. See The Pri ze Cases, 67 US (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
44 These instances of employment of the defence forces are specifi ed in § 20 l (2), and di scussed further 
in the text at notes 55-63 below. For uses of the military covered by§ 20 1(2), § 201(3) requires the 
President 'to inform Parliament, promptly and in appropriate detail , of -
~
a) the reasons for the employment of the defence force; 
b) any place where the force is being employed; 
c) the number of people involved; and 
(d) the period for which the force is ex pected to be employed'. 
The Defence Act, §§ 18(2)(e) & (4), adds the requirement of a report on 'expenditure incurred or 
expected to be incurred' . This information is somewhat more extensive than what the President must 
report in connection with a declaration of a state of national defence; in that context, § 203( l)'s 
reporting requirements do not include discuss ion of the period for which the declara tion is expected to 
last or of costs. I would view the several requirements as complementary rather than conflicting. 
45 § 18(5) of the Defence Act explicitly establishes Parliamentary review power over the President's 
uses of troops for a variety of purposes. It applies under circumstances specified in § 18( l ), which 
provides: 
In addition to the employment of the Defence Force by the President as contemplated in 
section 20 I (2) of the Constitution , the President or the Minister may authorize the 
employment of the Defence Force for service inside the Republic or in international waters, 
in order to -
~
a) preserve life, h~alth or proper\y in enJergency or humanitarian relief operations;. 
b) ensure the prov1s1on of essential services; 
c) support any department of state, including support for purposes of socio-economic 
upliftment; 
(d) effect national border control. , 
In these circumstances, under § 18(5), Parliament 
may by resolution within seven days after receiving information [about the employment of 
troops in question l from the Pres ident or the Minister -
~
a) confirm any such authorization of employment; . 
b) order the amendment of such authorization ; 
c) order tl_1e s_ubstitution for such authorization of any other appropriate 
authorization; or 
(d) order the termination of the employment of the Defence Force. 
As a reader has pointed out to me, however, this provision appears to cover only the employment of 
troops in South Africa or in international waters, and only for purposes in addition to those functions, 
notably including national defence and fulfillment of international obligations, fo r which § 20 l (2) of 
the Constitution authorizes the President to employ troops. It appears, therefore, that Parli ament has 
not yet asserted the broader review power which I argue it possesses under the Consti tution. . 
46 See text at notes 64-81 below. · 
47 Cf Michael D. Ramsey, 'Torturing Executive Power', (2005) 93 Geo. L.J. 1213, 1241 (US 
'Congress cannot appoint a commander who does not answer to the President ' ). 
48 I di scuss thi s provision in much more detail below. See text at notes 55-63 below. 
49 In the United States, '[t]here is ample evidence that the legislature was not meant to make tactical 
military decisions once war was initiated', according to Stephen Dycus et al., National Security Law, 
4'11 ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2007), p. 26. But a number of scholars have recently argued that 
although Congress wisely does not intervene in such decisions, constitutionally it could. See David J. 
Barron & Martin S. Lede1111an, 'The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb - Framing the Problem, 
Doctrine, and Original Understanding', (2008) 121 Harv. L. Rev. 692; Jules Lobel, 'Conflicts Between 
the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power Over the Conduct of War', Ohio St. L.J. 
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn .com/abstract=l028526; David Luban, 'On the Commander-in-
Chief Power' , available at http://ssrn .com/Abstract!D= l 026302. 
50 Section 36, to be sure, requires not Just a weighmg of national need and democratic reasonableness, 
but also the presence of ' law of general appltcation' or authority elsewhere in the constitution to 
sustain a limitation on rights. If a statute such as the Defence Act did not provide the necessary lega l 
basis, Parliamentary approval of the declaration of a state of national defence mi ght, or the 
Constitution itself might 111deed be seen as the foundation for orders to fi ght under such a declaration . 
51 Cf Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 78-82 (1866) (on the circumstances in which martial law may and 
may not be declared). . 
52 No constitutional question would arise, of course, if the Constitution does not apply to actions taken 
by the South African government outside its own borders and directed at nonc1tizens whose only 
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connection with South Africa is their intent to attack it. See generally Kaunda, paras 4 1-44 Uudgment 
of Chaska Ison CJ); id. para 228 Uudgment of O'Regan J). 
53 These questions of course recapitulate the argument in the United States over whether our President 
has authority, under the post-9/ 11 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (Sept. 18, 200 I), to order warrantless electronic survei llance of people suspected of links with Al 
Qaeda. South Africa has prohibited surveillance inside the country even in nationa l security matters 
absent a judicial order, see Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Commun ication-Re lated Information Act, Act No. 70 of 2002, §§ 2 -3. This statute does, however, 
permit emergency ' interception ' of communications without such an order, in order to locate their 
sender, when a law enforcement officer, including a member of the Defence Force, ' has reasonable 
grounds to believe that an emergency ex ists' because another person is in danger of dying or being 
seriously injured. Id. , §§ I, 8( I )(b); see also id. § 7 ("[i]nterception of communication to prevent 
serious bodily harm"). Moreover, it seems arguable that Parliament did not craft this Act's limits with 
the needs of a state of national defence in mind, and that the President might exercise the authority 
granted in the Defence Act (discussed infra in the text) to establi sh different rules to govern 
survei ll ance in that context. 
54 As noted earlier, see text at notes 41-42 above, the constitutiona l text does not make clear who a 
declaration of a state of national defence can be made against. But it is certainly possible to imagine 
domestic threats that are as grave as foreign ones, and so it is quite possible that a declaration could 
target a domestic group. 
55 But are there actua lly any interventions that are mandated by ' international obligation '? It may be 
that no international agreements to which South Africa is a party actually demand the commitment of 
South African troops, but it is also true that South Africa, as a member of the United Nations, the 
African Union, and the Southern African Development Community, has obligations to preserve human 
rights in other farts of the world. Section 20 I (2) can easi ly be read to refer to this broader, less 
insistent form o 'oblisation ', and to authorize the deployment of troops in its service. The White Paper 
on South African Participation in Internat iona l Peace Miss ions also can be read to reflect such a view, 
see ' White Paper on Peace Miss ions', 34. In any event, it wou ld seem from § 20 I (2)(c) itself that 
South Africa must have the power to enter into international obliga tions whose fulfi llment will entai l 
the employment of troops. 
56 So, too, it appears that 'employment of the defence force ... in cooperation with the police service ' 
does not require any declaration . (It is also noteworthy that the list in § 20 I (2) is not explicitly 
exclusive, Mota la & Ramaphosa, Constitutional law, p. 2 18, and in fact the Defence Act, § 18( I), 
provides for other uses of the defence forces as well , see note 45 above.) The question of how deeply 
the South African military is, or should be, involved in domestic law enforcement has important 
potential implications for the long-run strength of civi lian democracy. The Defence Act as 1t now 
stands appears to empower the defence forces to exercise a considerable range of domestic law 
.enforcement authorities, see Defence Act,§§ 20( 1) & 22. For an American response to this problem, 
see the longstanding, though ambiguous, Posse Comitatus Act, 18 USC § 1385 (2000). But these issues 
are beyond the scope of the present paper. 
57 There would be risks entailed in a variety of actions the President might take as part of routine 
military protection of the nation, especially if South Africa were actually to face any external threats . 
Today, fortunately, South Africa 'faces no known immediate threat' , according to Major-General Roy 
Andersen, head of the SANDF Reserve Force. Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, 'Overlooked Reservists 
Bolster Ranks of Cash-Strapped SANDF', Business Day, Oct. 13, 2004 (available on Westlaw -
ALLNEWS database). 
58 See text at notes 43 -49 above. 
59 Parliament, however, has not asserted this power in the Defence Act. See note 45 above. Vanessa 
Kent and Mark Malan have pointed out that the 'White Paper on Peace Missions' (which they report 
was adopted by Parliament in October 1999) envisioned greater responsibility for Parliament than the 
Defence Act Mandates. The White Paper appeared to see Parliamentary approva l as a prerequisite to 
the President's authorizing the deployment of troops where ' military enforcement measures' might be 
required, and seemed to contemplate, as a standard procedure, the President's 'tabling a proposal for 
ratifying the participation of a South African military contingent in a particular peace support 
operation'. 'White Paper on Peace Missions', 32; see Vanessa Kent & Mark Malan, 'Decisions, 
Decisions - South Africa's foray into regional peace operations' (Pretoria : Institute for Security 
Studies, Occas ional Paper 72, April 2003), available at 
http ://www. iss.co.za/index. php? link id= l 4&slink id=576&link type= l 2&slink type= l 2&tmpl id=3. 
I have found no instance of such a proposa l being presented to Parliament or voted on by 1t, and 
Kent and Malan in 2003 argued that troop deployment decisions were being taken 'at the level of the 
Presidency' with little input from Parliament (or other actors). In one instance, however, Parliamentary 
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committees decided to draft and support a resolution approving the already-underway employment of 
South African troops in Burundi. Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 'Joint Standing Committee on 
Defence; Select Committee on Security and Constitutional Affairs: Joint Meeting, 14 November 200 I, 
Deployment of the SANDF in Burundi', available at 
htt ://www. m .or .za/viewminute. h ?id= l 240. It is conceivable that thi s resolution was voted on by 
Parliament, ut penaps more likely that the committee itself voted on the reso lution and reported its 
vote to Parliament, which then took no further action. For examples of the Joint Committee on Defense 
apparently proceeding in this way -- reviewing troop deployments and then reporting the conclusion of 
its deliberations to Parliament (and on one occasion raising some concerns in the course of its 
deliberations) -- see Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 'SANDF Deployment to DARFUR, Sudan & 
within South Africa, Committee Annual Repo1t', Feb. 21, 2008, available at 
http: //www.pmg.org.za/node/ 10543 (last visited Apr. 20, 2008); Joint Standing Committee on Defence, 
'Annual Report: January - November 2007', available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2008/comreports/080304jcdefencereport.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2008). 
60 A si milar argument has been made by John Yoo to support the inference that the President does not 
need a declaration of war by Congress. Yoo notes that the United States constitutional text does 
explicitly prohibit the states from making war without Congress' consent, and contrasts that to the 
absence of any explicit textual requirement that the President obtain consent. John C. Yoo, 'Exchange: 
War Powers - War and the Constitutional Text', (2002) 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1639, 1666-67, citing U.S. 
Const., art. I, § I 0. I would not take this argument so far, either for South Africa or for the United 
States, but the absence in the South African Constitution of any textual requirement of Parliamentary 
assent to fighting does have to be reckoned with. 
6 1 Cf. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 US 869 (1971) (noting that a 
declaration of war mi~ht be s~en by Congress and the President as 'plac[ing] the nation in a posture in 
its international relat ions which would be against its best interests'). The Constitutional Court has 
recognized 'the government's special responsibility for and particufar expertise in' foreign affairs'. 
Kaunda, para 144, subsection 6 Uudgment of Chaskalson CJ). See also id., para 172 Uudgment of 
Ngcobo J); accord, id. , para 243 Uudgment of O'Regan J). 
62 Such paradoxical votes are possible, and in fact were cast by the me)llbers of the US House of 
Representatives on Operation Allied Force, the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. See Stephen Dycus et al., Nalional Security law, 3d ed. (New York: 
Aspen Law & Business, 2002), p. 412. 
63 For an account of the US courts' unwillingness to second-guess the President' s efforts to withdraw 
from Vietnam, despite the intense fighting that took place over severa l years in the process, see Dycus 
et al., National Security law, 4'11 ed., pp. 230-39. 
64 § 213(1) (limiting exceptions to those ' reasonably' made by Parliament). 
65 Parliamentary may either enact appropriations, § 2 I 3(2)(a), or by statute authorize 'direct charge[s]' 
against the National Revenue Fund. § 2 I 3(2)(b). Parliamentary action is not required when a direct 
charge 'is provided for in the Constitution'. Id. 
66 The President cannot carry on, that is, unless the spending is a direct charge ' provided for in the 
Constitution'. Id. But§ 213 itself identifies only one such direct charge, and that one - for revenue 
sharing with the provinces, § 213(3) - is far from the field of defence. 
67 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US 579, 643-44 (1952) (Jackson, J. , concurring). 
68 See generally Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973); Dycus et al., National Security 
Law, pp. 285-91. 
69 For an extensive account of Congress' efforts to cut off funding to the Nicaraguan Contras, and the 
Reagan administration's efforts to circumvent this cut-off with funds received from covert sales of 
arms to Iran, see id. pp. 4 73-522. 
70 See Motala & Ramaphosa, Constitutional law, pp. 216-17, discussing Executive Council, Western 
Cape Legislature, and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, 1995 (4) SA 867 
(CC), 1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (CC), paras 62 Uudgment of Chaskalson P) & 149-50 Uudgment of 
Ackermann & O'Regan JJ). 
71 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
72 See also§ 55(1)(b), giving the National Assembly power to 'initiate or prepare legislation, excepl 
money Bills' (emphasis added). 
73 US Const., art. I, § 7. 
74 Moreover, if Parfiament is really determined to block some exercise of executive war powers, it 
~robably can do so directly, as already noted. · 
5 US Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
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76 The P.rocedures specified for the National Assembly's consideration of appropriation bills also seem 
more ltkely to curta il Parliamentary resistance than to facilitate it. In the Rules of the National 
Assembly as of June 1999, available al http ://www.pmg.org.za/parlinfo/narules (last visited May 12, 
2008), a section on 'Spec ific Rules applicable to money bills' lays out a 'special procedure' which 
must be used for 'a bill appropriating money for the ordinary annual services of the government or 
imposing taxes, levies or duties for this purpose'. Rule 286(2). Under this procedure, 11 appears that 
committee considera tion of a ' main appropriation bill' must be completed within 'a maximum of ... 
seven consecutive Assembly working days'. Rul e 290(3). Moreover, if a money bill is subsequently 
amended by the Nationa l Council of Provinces, and is returned to the National Assembly fo r 
reconsideration, '[t]he debate on the reconsideration of the bill , including the consideration of any 
amendment, may not continue for more than one hour '. Rule 295(3). 
77 As the Congress of South African Trade Un ions (COSATU) has pointed out, it is also noteworthy 
that ss 55( I )(a) and 68(a) of the Constitution, which describe the legislative powers of the National 
Assembly and the Nat iona l Counc il of Provinces, respectively, both refer to these Houses' authority to 
amend, or in the Nationa l Counci l of Provinces' case to amend or propose amendments to, 'any 
legislat ion' (emphasis added). See Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), 'COSATU 
Submi ssion on the Republic of South Africa Second Amendment Bill, Submitted to the Portfolio 
Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development, 2 1 September 200 I ', s 4.2, available al 
http: //www.cosatu .org.za/docs/200 1/const.htm (last visited May 12, 2008). 
18 A Na tiona l Counc il of Provinces webpage, 
http://www.parl iament. gov .za/ live/content.php?ltem I D=34&Rev ision=en/ l 3&SearchStart=0 (last 
vis ited May I I , 2008), indi cates that thi s legislation has yet to be enacted. In early May 2008, a 
'tripart ite alli ance summit' of the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party, and 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions reportedly decided ' to allow Parliament to amend money 
bills' - one of severa l dec isions seen as 'suggest[ing] much greater influence of the AN C's leftist allies 
on economic policy .. .' Karima Brown & Amy Musgrave, 'South Africa: Leftward Leap If ANC 
Alli es Get Their Way', Business Day (Johannesburg), May 12, 2008, available al 
http://allafrica .com/stori es/200805 12035 l .html. COSATU has 111 the past called for ' the tablin~ of an 
adequate money bills amendment procedure bill as a matter of urgency' . 'COSATU Submission', s. 
4.2. As COSA TU noted in that submission, id., Article 2 I (I) of Schedule 6 of the Constitution 
provides that '[w]here the new Consti tution requires the enactment of national or provincial legislation, 
that legislation must be enacted by the relevant authority within a reasonable period of the date the new 
Constitution takes effect'. 
79 The Parliamentary Monitoring Group's description of 'The Legislative Process', 
http://www.pmg.org.za/par1info/sectionb3 (last visited May 12, 2008), observes that ' [a]t present 
Money Bills may only be debated and not amended as, according to the Constitution, Parliament must 
st ill devise legislation for a procedure to amend Money Bills'. COSATU cites an example of a bill that 
could not be amended because of its status as a money bill in 'COSATU Submission', s 4.2. 
· Parliamentarx rules appear to produce a particularly odd result - that the National Assembly cannot 
amend money bills, but the National Council of Provinces (in genera l the less powerful house with 
respect to matters of nat ional rather than provinci al concern) can. Under the National Assembly's 
'specia l procedure ' for money bills, see note 76 supra, there is simply no provision fo r amendments -
either by committees or by individual members of Parliament - in the Assembly's initial decision on 
such a bill. Oddly enough, there is also no explicit prohibition of amendments in these provisions; they 
simply are not mentioned . 
Under ss 75 & 77(3) of the Constitution, the bill then goes to the National Council of Provinces. 
Draft National Council of Provinces rules adopted b7 its Rules Committee in 1999 do authorize 
amendments of 'Ordinary Bills not affecting provinces - for which s 75 of the Constitution specifies 
the appropriate Parliamentary processes -- while not ing that '[iJt is unclear whether money Bills should 
have a procedure separa te from the standard procedure for sect ion 75 Bills'. Note to 'Part 4: Section 75 
Bill s', Draft Rules of the National Council of Provinces, available al 
http://www.pmg.org.za/parlinfo/ncoprules (last visited May 12, 2008); for the rules applicable to 
amending section 75 bill s, see Rules 203(i) & 205(l)(a), id. 
If the National Counci l of Provinces does follow the rules for section 75 bills and amends a money 
bill, then the bill, as amended, returns to the National Assembly. At that point, according to National 
Assembly Rule 295( I) , further amendments are possible, but only certain amendments: 'The Assembly 
must consider any amendments proposed by the Council. No further amendments may be considered 
unless moved by the Minister in charge of the bill , who may do so without prior notice'. As mentioned 
in note 76 supra, the debate over the amended bill , and over any amendments moved by the Minister, 
must be completed within an hour. 
80 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 'Minutes for Defence Joint Committee, 26 March 2003, White 
Paper on Peacekeeping: Discussion' (available al http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=2596) 
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(las t vis ited Jan. 26, 2007). For another sugges tion of the degree of operational fl ex ibility that current 
defence budgeting g ives the Executi ve, see Wyndham Hart ley, 'Africa n Peace Burden Cannot Be SA 's 
Alone, Warns Lekota', Business Day, Feb. 16, 2005 (availabl e on Westl aw, ALLNEWS database). 
8 1 The statutory bas is for such adjustments ultimately li es in the Public Finance Management Act, Act 
No. I of 1999, as amended, under which a government department has a number of statutory routes by 
which it can increase its spending on a particular function , such as peacekeeping, without pnor spec ific 
Parliamentary authori zat ion. See id. §§ 16, 30, 34, 43, & 92; see Kent & Ma lan, Decisions, Decisions 
(discuss ing s§ 16 & 30). For an illustrative recent funding bill , see 2006/07Appropriation Bi ll , as 
introduced, Schedule, Vote 2 1 (Defence), available at http://www. in fo.gov.za /gazet te/bill s/2006/b2-
06.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2007) (a llocating R820 million specifica lly and exclusively to ' peace 
support operations' with in a 'force emp loyment' budget of RI .4 1 billion). For an example of a 
peacekeeping mi ss ion whose costs were expected to be covered without the need for new legislation , 
see Letter from President T.M. Mbeki to Speaker of the Nationa l Assembly, 'Employment of the South 
African National Defence Force in Sudan in Ful filment of the Internat iona l Obl igat ions of South Africa 
Towards the African Union ', July 2, 2004, available at 
http ://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2003/comreports/040729pres1etters. htm (last visi ted Mar. 5, 2007) (noting 
that costs wou ld be accommodated withm the Department of Defence's 'current allocation fo r Peace 
Surport Operations'). 
82 89( I). 
83 I 02(2). I am grateful to Chri stina Murray for ca lling this sect ion to my attention . 
84 53( 1). 
85 
~§ 77, 75. 
